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A

major source of failure for new ventures is the
entrepreneurs’ misunderstanding of the productmarket fit. Recently, researchers have suggested
that to get a better understanding of the productmarket fit, entrepreneurs should “get out of the building” and
interview many customers. This approach, while advantageous,
is not without drawbacks. This article presents a conceptual
model that incorporates the characteristics of “getting out of the
building” to conduct customer interviews, and the biases that
can arise to influence the entrepreneurs’ misjudgment of the
product-market fit. We provide recommendations to overcome
these biases.
Keywords: biases; interview; entrepreneur; productmarket fit; opportunity identification
Virtually every study of product success has confirmed the positive relationship between understanding customers’ needs and new product performance
(Bharadwaj, Nevin, and Wallman, 2012). Cooper
(1979) goes so far as to state that the failure to understand customer needs “spells disaster.” The relationship between business success and understanding the market is especially important for startups.
Indeed, entrepreneurs often target new markets with
innovative technologies and novel business ideas
(Navis and Glynn, 2010). In spite of the opportunities associated with this strategy, they face two fundamental changes. First, the market spaces that they
choose to enter are often “untested and incompletely understood” (Navis and Glynn, 2010; Tushman
and Anderson, 1986: 444); in such markets, customers’ needs and preferences are often characteristically
ambiguous (Navis and Glynn, 2010). Second, entrepreneurs in general lack knowledge about the markets for their products and often are unable to produce outputs that satisfy customer needs, thereby
having a high possibility of dissolution (Stuart, Ha,
and Hybels, 1999). As a result, developing reliable
means to understand the product-market fit becomes the forefront in the strategy of entrepreneurial firms (Blank, 2013).
Yet, venture founders often fail to understand
the market correctly, resulting in the demise of their
startups (Bhide, 1994; Gruner and Homburg, 2000).
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2015

Some (e.g., Bhide, 1994; Blank, 2013; Sykes and
Dunham, 1995) suggest that this deficiency stems
from how entrepreneurs investigate ideas. Traditionally, entrepreneurs engage in extensive up-front
planning, in which they describe the target market,
develop a comprehensive distribution strategy, and
lay out five years of financial projections. They tend
to rely primarily on secondary data and/or survey
responses, operating in a “stealth mode” by keeping
their ideas carefully hidden (Blank, 2013). These
techniques, however, do not generate a deep understanding of customer needs (Daghfous, Ashill, and
Rod, 2013) and, at best, serve as rough surrogates
for personal interactions with the customers (Gorry
and Westbrook, 2011). As a result, entrepreneurs
may develop incorrect assumptions about customers, miss opportunities, and lock their startups onto
a fatal path (Bhide, 1994).
In response, authors (e.g., Blank, 2013;
Ries, 2011) have introduced a host of new
methodologies whereby managers directly hear
the voice of the customer (VOC). VOC refers
to “a complete set of customer wants and
needs, expressed in the customer’s own language, organized the way the customer thinks
about, uses, and interacts with the product . . .
and prioritized by the customer in terms of
both importance and performance . . . [in relation to] existing alternatives” (Bharadwaj et al.,
2012; Katz, 2002: 170). An effective way to
capture VOC is to interview customers
(Bharadwaj et al., 2012). Such interviews are
particularly useful for entrepreneurs because
they focus on customer needs and problems,
occur early and often, and take place in the
customers’ natural environments. Indeed, leading institutions of higher education, such as
Babson, Harvard, Stanford, Darden, University
of Michigan, and dozens more now stress the
technique (Blank, 2013). Authors of bestselling entrepreneurship books suggest the VOC
can be captured by getting “out of the building” to talk to potential purchasers (Blank,
2013; Ries, 2011). The process centers on
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gathering real, actionable, and timely data, and
often generates more than 100 interviews within a few months (Blank, 2013). Indeed, more
than 100 entrepreneurship groups in dozens of
countries, often comprised of thousands of
members, have begun stressing the importance
of the interview.
These interviews, however, can potentially generate major judgment errors (e.g., Adams and Hublikar, 2010; Bharadwaj et al., 2012; Cooper, Edgett,
and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Cooper and Dreher, 2010)
and such errors are compounded if the interviews
are conducted by entrepreneurs. Indeed, research
has shown that entrepreneurs tend to have greater
cognitive biases than nonentrepreneurs (Busenitz
and Barney, 1997; Keh, Der Foo, and Boon, 2002;
Simon and Houghton, 1999). For example, Busenitz
and Barney (1997) found entrepreneurs have a higher degree of overconfidence than managers do.
Krueger and Brazeal (1994) provided evidence that
entrepreneurs have higher illusion of control and
tend to overlook real obstacles. These biases frequently arise in assessing markets (Mattei and Hellebusch 2006), deciding to launch a venture (Simon
and Houghton, 1999; Simon, Houghton, and Aquino, 2000), and identifying opportunities (Keh et al,
2002), the exact situations startups face. The judgment errors associated with these cognitive biases
may lead to inaccurate understanding of productmarket fit in face-to-face interviews, resulting in less
rational, less comprehensive decision making.
In this article, we offer a theoretical framework
about the antecedents of potential cognitive biases
that may arise in face-to-face interviews and the role
it plays in the judgment of product-market fit. Product-market fit is defined as being in a good market
with a product that can satisfy that market
(Andreessen, 2007), and is not a typical outcome
variable examined in the entrepreneurial cognition
research. However, recent lean startup movement
has emphasized the importance of product-market
fit in the success of a new startup (Blank, 2013). Andreessen (2007) suggests that all successful startups
are the ones that have reached product-market fit,
and getting to product-market fit should be the ultimate goal of a startup. Blank (2013) also echoes this
sentiment in his lean startup model. He argues that
entrepreneurs should first engage in customer discover interviews to isolate customer needs and then
conduct customer validation interviews to determine
that the proposed product will meet those needs. He
further explains that the goal of both of these steps
is to achieve better product-market fit. Productmarket fit, which is not a typical outcome variable in
entrepreneurial cognitive research, should be studied, and may provide a valuable contribution to the
60 New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
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entrepreneurial cognitive research literature. In fact,
not achieving product-market fit may be the primary
reason why new ventures have poor performance
and even fail (Blank, 2013).
Our theoretical model, drawing on the information processing theory (Pech and Cameron,
2006), examines how the way entrepreneurs gather
information may influence the cognitive biases arising in face-to-face interviews. Indeed, while cognitive biases may exist in different forms, their presence, magnitude, and consequences may be a function of the way entrepreneurs obtain information
(Simon and Houghton, 2002; Zacharakis and Shepherd, 2001). Given this, many scholars have called
for research focusing on how best to conduct the
interview process (e.g., Adams and Hublikar, 2010;
Cooper et al., 2004; Gorry and Westbrook, 2011;
Harmancioglu, Grinstein, and Goldman, 2010).
Our article contributes to the literature and managerial practice by answering these calls. First, we
strive to identify which biases, including ones not
previously discussed in the entrepreneurship literature, are likely to be exhibited by entrepreneurs during interviews, the underlying theoretical mechanisms, and the strategies to manage these biases.
Second, we believe that the article also contributes
to the literature on entrepreneurial cognition. While
several papers have suggested that entrepreneurial
environments, in general, lead entrepreneurs to exhibit cognitive biases (Busenitz and Barney, 1997), it
is rare that a research on entrepreneurship takes a
finer grain approach by suggesting specific characteristics that are associated with specific biases.
Thirdly, the paper makes a contribution to theory by
relating biases to an important and growing entrepreneurial practice, namely interviewing large numbers of individuals. Finally, the article’s propositions
contribute to the emerging research on VOC.
This article proceeds as follows: we first offer an
overview of the theory that grounds our research
model. We then introduce our propositions based
on our theoretical framework, followed by a few recommendations to tackle the challenges associated
with interviews. We conclude our article by revisiting
the key takeaways of this research and directions for
future research.

Theoretical Framework
Information Processing Theory and
Diagnostic Cues
We use information processing theory, the dominant
paradigm within cognitive psychology (Pech and
Cameron, 2006), to explore the method by which
entrepreneurs gather information that may influence
2
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the cognitive biases arising in face-to-face interviews.
The fundamental assumption underlying the theory
is that individuals have limited ability to process information. Examining information processing as it
relates to entrepreneurship is particularly relevant
because it helps explain how individuals identify and
evaluate opportunities (Pech and Cameron, 2006)
and is one of the major factors that differentiate entrepreneurs from managers (Kaish and Gilad,
1991).As explained by Mitchell et al. (2004), examining how information processing relates to these issues is crucial to advancing the entrepreneurship
field. This has led Singh and Ronch (2011) to assert
that understanding how entrepreneurs process information may help to unlock important aspects of new
venture creation.
An inherent component of information processing theory relates to the processing of diagnostic
cues in order to make decisions (Simon and Houghton, 2003). Diagnostic cues are indicators that are
present, given one outcome, and absent given the
alternative outcome (Juslin, 1994). For example, an
entrepreneur may grow more convinced that he or
she should launch a certain product if potential customers state they would buy the product (the diagnostic cue). In other words, individuals start with
initial beliefs, but then update those beliefs based on
cues they receive from the environment (Paul and
Lancaster, 2007).
But, individuals do not always process cues objectively. Instead the cues are “filtered” by the decision environment, which includes factors such as
type of cues, amount of cues, and the complexity of
the cues. These conditions affect whether cues are
noticed, how they are interpreted, and the extent to
which they are incorporated into one’s judgments
(Felício, Caldeirinha, and Rodrigues, 2012). As such,
decision environment has a major influence on the
effectiveness and efficiency of decision making
(Salmon, 2013).
While the role of decision environment in processing cues could actually yield superior results
(Busenitz and Barney, 1997), this is often not the
case (Simon and Hougton, 2002). Decision environment can lead individuals to utilize cues incorrectly
in three ways. First, it may lead to using an irrelevant cue. Individuals may treat cues that are not relevant to the decision as though they are relevant
(Juslin, 1994). In this instance, entrepreneurs may act
on cues that they believe are associated with success,
but, which in actuality, are not (Simon and Houghton, 2002). Second, entrepreneurs may place too
much weight on relevant cues (Pech and Cameron,
2006). To clarify this concept, we provide the following hypothetical example. In certain decision enPublished by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2015

vironments, an entrepreneur might conclude that
his or her product idea can be successful because he
or she interviewed a hundred people (the population) and believes that the majority of them indicated they would use the product (the cue). However,
less than 10 percent of the interviewees may have
made such a statement. A third and final diagnostic
error could occur when individuals underestimate
the diagnostic value of a given cue (Nisbett, Zukier,
and Lemley, 1981). They may believe that few individuals indicated they would use their product,
when in reality many did.
Importantly, extensive literature has indicated
that this misuse of cues can lead individuals to employ specific cognitive biases (Åstebro and Elhedhli,
2006; Busenitz and Barney, 1997). For example
(Simon et al., 2000), when faced with far more cues
than they can manage, individuals may exhibit the
availability bias by only using those they can most
easily recall (Pech and Cameron, 2006). Similarly,
when one encounters two contradictory cues, such
as a qualitative assertion by one person versus quantitative statistical evidence summarizing findings
from many people, he or she is more likely to use
the qualitative cue over the quantitative one (Keh et
al., 2002).
To summarize, the paragraph above suggests
that the decision environment may lead to the misapplication of cues, which in turn, may lead to
cognitive biases. Following this logic, we will develop eight propositions that examine how the
characteristic associated with interviewing (the decision environment) may help predict which biases
an entrepreneur may exhibit, and what might be
done to minimize the reliance on cognitive biases.

Information Search Characteristics and Biases

The philosophy of “getting out of the building” and
interviewing potential customers opens up the opportunity for entrepreneurs to obtain informational
cues to enrich their decision environment. However, the way these cues are processed represents an
opportunity and a challenge. Indeed, conducting
early interviews may become the dominant method
for starting ventures to understand their customers
(Blank, 2013). Such interviews may have a greater
impact on product success than any other single
product introduction practice (Adams and Hublikar,
2010), and are one of the strongest factors that separate the best and worst performers (Cooper et al.,
2004). In particular, the interviewer obtains concrete
information that is rich in contextual detail, which
allows him or her to assess better the productmarket fit (Kardes, Cronley, and Kim, 2006; Trope
and Liberman, 2003). More specifically, the rich, biOut of the Building, into the Fire
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directional communication facilitates the transfer of
complex ideas (Daghfous et al., 2013), which can
lead to promising startups (Peters and Brush, 1996).
While startups can accumulate rich, factual, actionable, and timely data through interviews, such an
enriched decision environment may be associated
with a variety of cues that increases the complexity
of decision making. Under such circumstances, cognitive biases are likely to arise as “filtering” mechanisms (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Forbes 2005).
The cognitive biases may lead the entrepreneur to
make errors in judgment (Barnes, 1984; Simon and
Houghton, 2002; Simon et al., 2000). The biases may
occur because of how the interviews are executed,
and also because of the characteristics of the interviewing process. Figure 1 represents a model of the
entrepreneurial interviewing process, and the biases
that may result from the process. As the model illustrates, information search characteristics inherent in
the interviewing process may lead to biases and may
result in erroneous judgments. The four search characteristics are (1) interviews that are conducted faceto-face; (2) interviews that are conducted sequentially; (3) interviews where large numbers of people are
interviewed; and (4) interviews that are conducted by
entrepreneurs. In the following section, we develop
propositions related to each of these search characteristics.

Proposition Development
Face-to-Face Interviews

Entrepreneurs are encouraged to “get of the building” and interview customers directly. Face-to-face
interviews provide concrete information versus an
abstract representation from reports and secondary
data (Kardes et al., 2006). The concrete and
firsthand information allows the entrepreneur to garner more accurate and detailed information that may
be beneficial in making a judgment of productmarket fit. For instance, the entrepreneur may read
a survey report suggesting that customers like the
potential product. However, by interviewing customers face-to-face, the entrepreneur can better determine the product-market fit because he or she
not only hears what is said but how it is said (e.g.,
the extent to which the customer was enthusiastic
and animated). Thus, the face-to-face interview allows for not only cognitive responses, but affective
and behavioral responses as well (Breckler, 1984).
Therefore, conducting face-to-face interviews may
lead to biases that may result in suboptimal judgments. The three potential biases are the (1) saliency
effect, (2) vividness effect, and (3) reasoning by
analogy.

Figure 1. Information Search Characteristics and Biases
62 New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
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Saliency Effect. In conducting the face-to-face in-

terview, the entrepreneur is collecting information to
make a judgment regarding the product-market fit.
Certain interviews may stand out because a particular interviewee may be very different from others.
For example, the interviewee may be attractive, have
a tattooed face, be humorous, or have a handicap
that distinguishes him or her from others. In such
case, the entrepreneur believes the cue provides
great insight, even though it does not. More specifically, the information from the interview may become more salient and hence more readily accessible
from memory. Although the information may not
have greater probative value, the accessible information may be more likely to be used to form judgments (Herr, Kardes and Kim, 1991). Thus:
Proposition 1: The more salient the characteristics
of interviewees, the higher the likelihood that the
entrepreneur will form inaccurate judgments about
the product-market fit.

Vividness Effect. Saliency effect occurs because of
the contrast with other interviewees, but vivid information is context free (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Vividness effect may occur because the information
may be emotionally interesting or image provoking.
For example, in the interview process, the interviewee may provide an emotional or interesting anecdote.
Given that it is anecdotal evidence, the information
may be specific to that one person and may not be
informative. However, because that information is
interesting or evokes emotion, it is more accessible
from memory and will have a greater effect on the
entrepreneur’s judgments (Herr et al., 1991; Kisielius
and Sternthal, 1984). In this way, the diagnostic cues stemming from this interview may influence judgment to a disproportional amount. Thus:
Proposition 2: The more emotional or interesting
the interviewees, the higher the likelihood that the
entrepreneur will form inaccurate judgments about
the product-market fit.

Reasoning by Analogy. Whereas the vividness ef-

fects may lead an entrepreneur to give too much
weight to a valid cue, if an entrepreneur reasons by
analogy, he or she may give weight to a cue that is
not valid. In forming judgments, entrepreneurs tend
to use reasoning by analogy (Simon and Houghton
2002; Stumpf and Dunbar, 1991). Reasoning by
analogy is the process whereby an entrepreneur uses
a recognizable cue and makes simple analogies to get
a better sense of the interview information. This can
be especially true in a face-to-face interview where

Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2015

there are many vivid and salient cues that can be
used to generate simple analogies. However, faceto-face interviews may also lead to greater errors
in reasoning by analogy because the vivid and salient cues may be inappropriate and not directly related in this context (Gilovich, 1981; Haley and
Stumpf, 1989). Analogies are often dramatic, suggesting they will be readily recalled. However, almost by definition, they are overly simplistic and
apply to a slightly different context. For example, a
potential customer may mention he or she was an
early adopter of an I-phone because it had a nice
appearance. The entrepreneur may become unduly
encouraged by this cue believing his or her situation
is analogous because he or she is also offering a
product that looks nice. However, the success of the
I-phone may have stemmed from many other factors, such as Apple’s reputation for innovation or
the company’s large investment in marketing. Thus:
Proposition 3: In face-to-face interviews, inappropriate cues may be used by the entrepreneur in reasoning by analogy, and information from interviews
involving analogy may be disproportionally weighed
to form inaccurate judgments about the productmarket fit.

Interviews Conducted Sequentially

In interviewing customers, the entrepreneur usually
conducts the interviews individually to generate
fruitful insights into customer needs and problems
(Kahn, 1990; Roller, 1987). This allows the entrepreneur to assess better the product-market fit.
However, conducting individual interviews means
that the entrepreneur must conduct the interviews
sequentially. The sequential interview process may
lead to biases that result in suboptimal judgments
and wrong decisions. The two potential biases are
(1) the primacy and recency effect and (2) contrast
effect.

Primacy and Recency Effect. The sequential interview process means that the entrepreneur interviews customers in order, and studies have shown
that order has an effect on judgment (e.g., Anderson, 1965; Hovland, 1957; Miller and Campbell,
1959). The order effect has been labeled the primacy and recency effect. The primacy and recency effect occurs because the initial and the most recent
information have the greatest effect on judgment
since they are easier to remember (Miller and Campbell, 1959). This means that cues contained in the earlier
and later interviews conducted by the entrepreneur
will have a greater effect on the evaluation of the
Out of the Building, into the Fire
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product-market fit, despite the fact that the information from these interviews may have less of a probative value. Thus:
Proposition 4: In interviewing customers sequentially, earlier and later interviews will have a greater
effect on the entrepreneur’s judgments and may lead
to an inaccurate assessment of the product-market
fit.

Contrast Effect. The sequential interview process
may also lead to the contrast effect. Judgments are
not made in isolation but in relation to a context,
and contrast effect occurs when judgments are shifted away from the contextual reference point
(Kenrick and Gutierres, 1980; Brickman, Coates, and
Janoff-Bulman, 1978). For example, 50 degrees
Fahrenheit in February feels warm, while in August
it feels cold. Thus, the context can affect peoples’
judgment. In the situation of the entrepreneur conducting a sequential interview, an interviewee may be
very negative about the product while others are
mildly positive. The entrepreneur, by focusing on
the very negative evaluation, or cue, and using it as
the reference point, may perceive the mildly positive
evaluation as extremely positive. This suggests that the
entrepreneur’s interpretation of the cue may not always be accurate. More specifically, the overestimation of the
mildly positive evaluation may lead the entrepreneur
to form an inaccurate assessment of a productmarket fit. Thus:
Proposition 5: In interviewing customers sequentially, an extreme interview may be used as a reference point and influence the entrepreneur’s perception of other interviews, leading to an inaccurate assessment of the product-market fit.

Interviewing Large Numbers of Customers

Proponents of interviewing (e.g., Blank, 2013) suggest speaking with a large number of customers, so
the entrepreneur can obtain a substantial amount of
information and increase the accuracy of the information. Although interviewing a large number of
customers is a good idea, it leads to unwanted consequences if the entrepreneur is not attentive. It may
result in (1) overconfidence and (2) dilution effect.

Overconfidence. Accuracy of information can be
assumed if many customers provide the same information. It allows for the possibility of triangulation,
convergence, and overall corroboration in determining product-market decisions. However, if the interviewing procedure results in interviews of customers
64 New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
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that are associated (e.g., the interview takes place in
the office of one company), the entrepreneur may
have redundant information. The redundancy of information means the information is correlated. The
consequence of the correlated information is that
the entrepreneur, in reality, is not receiving new independent information, and the accuracy of the information may be limited. In other words, the entrepreneur may treat two cues as though each has distinct diagnostic value when they do not. This may
lead to overconfidence.
Overconfidence is the overestimation of the certainty of information (Simon and Houghton, 2003).
Thus, overconfidence is the degree of confidence in
relation to the accuracy of the information, and may
lead to errors in judgment (Hayward, Shepherd, and
Griffin, 2006). If the interviews are from customers
who are associated, the redundant information increases the certainty but not the accuracy of the information (Oskamp, 1965). In this case, the entrepreneur becomes overconfident, and judgments
about product-market fit may be incorrect. Thus:
Proposition 6: Large numbers of interviews targeting customers that are related may introduce redundant information, leading to the entrepreneur’s overconfidence, thereby resulting in the entrepreneur’s
inaccurate assessment of the product-market fit.

Dilution Effect. The goal of interviewing customers is to acquire relevant (i.e., diagnostic) information to assess product-market fit. However, not
all information is the same in diagnostic value (Herr
et al., 1991; Kardes, Kim, and Lim, 1994). Although
diagnostic information is critical in forming judgments, nondiagnostic/irrelevant information is useless and should not be used.
When conducting large numbers of interviews,
the entrepreneur is collecting large amounts of information. Some information may be diagnostic and
some may not. The use of diagnostic information
results in an accurate judgment about the productmarket fit. However, when faced with large
amounts of information, the entrepreneur may try to
use all information to make the judgment. However,
the mere presence of nondiagnostic information will
reduce the effect of the diagnostic information
(Nisbett et al., 1981). For example, hypothetically in
the interviews, the entrepreneur discovered that, on
average, older customers found the product more
attractive. The entrepreneur also found that people
who liked the product slept on average eight hours a
day, and liked to watch the television program
Swamp People. The information about how much they
sleep and what show they watch may be irrelevant,
6
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and if so, should have no bearing on the productmarket judgment. However, the entrepreneur may
try to overprocess all the information and the effect
of the diagnostic information (older customer) may
receive less weight in the product-market fit judgment. In other words, valid cues may be “lost.”
Thus:
Proposition 7: Conducting a large number of interviews may lead to nondiagnostic information, which
in turn, may reduce the effect of diagnostic information, resulting in an inaccurate assessment of
product-market fit.

may conclude that he or she was right all along in
that the product is a good fit for that market.
The above discussion suggests that entrepreneurs will make several errors related to processing
cues. They might notice a disproportionately large
number of positive cues and a disproportionately
small number of negative cues. Furthermore, entrepreneurs are likely to misinterpret negative or neutral cues as positive. Thus:
Proposition 8: By personally conducting interviews,
entrepreneurs may process and interpret interview
information that supports their personal beliefs, resulting in an inaccurate assessment of the productmarket fit.

Interviews Conducted by Entrepreneur

An advantage of having entrepreneurs conduct the
interviews is that they get firsthand information that
is not filtered. The information is not based on the
assumptions, perceptions, or guesstimates of others.
However, being personally involved may also have a
negative ramification, giving rise to suboptimal judgments due to biased processing. Biased processing,
in this case, refers to the tendency to view information positively and ignore disconfirming evidence.

Discussion

The approach of “get out of the building and interview real customers” constitutes sound advice with
many positive advantages. The entrepreneur can
acquire real, actionable, and timely data. However, it
is also not without problems. The interviewing process may lead to biases that adversely influence the
quality of a judgment. If the entrepreneur is not
cognizant of these biases when interviewing customers, bad judgments may transpire and lead to
wrong decisions. Thus, entrepreneurs should follow
certain procedures in the interviewing process to
reduce biases. Especially, entrepreneurs are more
susceptible to cognitive biases than others (Busenitz
and Barney, 1997; Forbes 2005) and therefore, the
interviews conducted by them may be particularly
prone to certain biases. They can, however, reduce
these by following a few recommendations (Table 1).

Biased processing. Biased processing deals with
what and how information is processed and interpreted to form a judgment. The entrepreneur exploring a startup opportunity is likely to overestimate
its strengths (Palich and Bagby, 1995), underestimate
its weaknesses (Palich and Bagby, 1995), and perceive little risk (Simon et al., 2000). More problematic is the especially strong tendency of entrepreneurs
to fail to adjust their beliefs based on feedback
(Åstebro, Jeffrey, and Adomdza, 2007; Parker,
2006). This suggests that entrepreneurs may emphasize interview information that is
consistent with their initial optimistic Table 1. Cognitive Biases and Recommendations
conclusions, while ignoring inforSearch Characteristics
Biases
Recommendations
mation that is inconsistent with them
Minimize impact of irrelevant
(Posavac, Kardes, and Brakus, 2010; Conducted Face-to-Face Saliency Effect
Vividness Effect
information; weigh equally the
Lee, Acito, and Day, 1987; Lord,
Reasoning by Analogy
information provided by interRoss, and Lepper 1979; Sanviewees; avoid judgment based
bonmatsu, Posavac, Kardes, and
on appearances; audio-tape
interviews
Mantel, 1998). For example, the entrepreneur may believe that a certain Conducted Sequentially
Primacy and Recency Effect Review interviews in random
market fits well with the product. By
Contrast Effect
order
holding this belief, he or she will only
Interviews are from different
look for interview information that Large Numbers of People Overconfidence
Dilution Effect
people who are not associated;
will support that belief. Furthermore,
review audio-tape interviews
interview information that provides
Understand the interview is to
Biased Processing
weak support for that belief may be Entrepreneur Conducts
explore, not to validate
interpreted as strong support. The
entrepreneur becomes confident, and
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2015
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Judgment errors might occur due to the saliency
or vividness effects, and/or the tendency to make irrelevant associations. Therefore, it is critical that the
entrepreneur should minimize the attention paid to
irrelevant information. Information provided by interviewees who demonstrate higher levels of saliency
or vividness should be given the same weight as the
information provided by other interviewees, and the
entrepreneur should also avoid judging the quality
of the interviewees’ opinions based on their appearances. One effective tool to accomplish this is
audio-taping the interviews. Furthermore, the entrepreneur should review the interviews in random order to reduce the recency and contrast biases. Because
these biases are caused by the order in which the
entrepreneur conducts interviews, randomization
can minimize memory issues.
The entrepreneur should also make sure that
interviews are from different customers who are not
associated. If related customers provide the same
information, the information may be redundant. Research on the knowledge-based view indicates that
knowledge redundancy undermines the chance to
incorporate diverse perspectives and reduces the
likelihood of creating radical innovation (Makri, Hitt,
and Lane, 2010). Extending this idea to interviews
about product-market fit, one may expect that interviews conducted in a homogeneous customer group
might be less valuable because similar information
might be repeatedly reported. Conclusions about the
product-market fit could sometimes be misleading if
the product is targeted to a broader range of customers. By contrast, if the entrepreneur involves diverse groups of customers in the interviews, he or
she will have the opportunity to see different customer needs and incorporate different opinions
about the product-market fit. The interviews may
therefore generate more insightful discoveries and
may be more easily generalized.
Bringing multiple individuals into the decision
making, and using processes such as devil's advocacy, may be especially effective (Schweiger, Sandberg,
and Ragan, 1986). Devil’s advocacy occurs when
someone takes a position, even if he or she does not
believe it, that opposes someone else’s conclusion.
Those advocating the approach believe that the subsequent debate will generate better insight. Also,
Winkler and Poses (1993) suggested that individuals
may limit their own biases by writing down all the
reasons supporting their prediction and all the reasons disconfirming it.
Finally, the entrepreneur must keep reminding
himself that the goal of the interview is to explore,
not validate. The process of validation, in nature, is
often confirmatory, rather than exploratory; that is,
when an entrepreneur focuses on validation, he or
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she often tries to seek out information indicating a
link that is believed to exist, rather than to explore
the unknown. Thus, if an interview is geared toward
validation, the entrepreneur typically has already established causal reasoning about the product-market
fit. This could lead, consciously or subconsciously,
to focusing on information that confirms the initial
hypothesis, and ignoring information that refutes it.
This selective inclusion and exclusion of information
may constrain the entrepreneur’s opportunity to incorporate new insights, thus limiting the discovery
power of the interview. Indeed, entrepreneurship
research has highlighted that new ventures have a
competitive advantage because they have less inertia,
more innovative ideas, and a greater ability to see
opportunities (Simon and Houghton, 2002). As a
result, the entrepreneur must always keep an open
mind in the interview to maximize knowledge acquisition. One particularly effective technique may be to
focus initially only on objectively observing customer problems, and only afterwards, trying to solve
them by developing a product or service (Blank,
2013).

Limitations and Conclusions

We acknowledge a limitation of our research. We
have not parceled out all the possible nuances of the
complex web of relationships related to characteristics of decision-making contexts and cognitive biases. This would be particularly difficult given that biases, while distinct, are often closely related to subtle
differences in mechanisms, which may lead to exhibition of one bias versus another (Hogarth, 1987).
As Whetten’s (1989) noted, “[It is] unfair to expect
that theorist be sensitive to all possible boundary
constraints … in the absence of experimental evidence, we must be realistic regarding the extent of a
theorist foreknowledge.” Given the relatively new
research attention on the intersection of interviewing, entrepreneurship, and product-market fit, we
believe that this investigation may serve as a valuable
first step toward unraveling all the nuances of the
relationships. We fully recognize, however, that this
article is not an ending point, but hope it provides a
valuable springboard for those who follow.
There are several directions for future research
related to this article that could advance the field.
First, scholars should empirically test the paper’s
propositions. Second, exploring whether the assertions in this article apply equally to entrepreneurs
and managers will increase our understanding of the
article’s boundary constraints. Finally, scholars may
want to uncover the extent to which one of the proposed relationships is stronger than another.
8
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In conclusion, the current investigation highlights the importance of “getting out of the building” in the interview process, and acknowledges the
potential cognitive issues associated with adopting

this approach. While biases are difficult to eliminate,
we believe that the suggested remedy techniques
can, to some extent, reduce their effects in the entrepreneurial process.
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